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Abstract: Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buo-
nomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical pro-
posals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconcil-
ing the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of 
fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories 
among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or 
facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue 
against a central assumption of the criterion: semantic descriptivism. 
Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that 
the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it 
commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of 
the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, 
mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates 
problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and 
neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could 
provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion. 
Keywords: Descriptivism; factualism; fundamental categories; mental 
vocabulary.  
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1. Introduction 
 In "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" Wilfrid Sellars pro-
poses, as the fundamental task of the philosophical endeavor, to reconcile 
the scientific image of the world with the manifest image, that is, the image 
produced by our scientific theories of natural sciences with the image we all 
take for granted. The difference between these two images turns to be es-
pecially evident when contrasting the common-sense perspective of humans 
as autonomous persons, responsible of their actions and motivated by 
thoughts and feelings, with a scientific perspective describing humans as 
biological systems without free will whose behavior is caused by physical 
processes and mechanisms. 
 Following in the footsteps of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo 
(2021) have proposed a scientific turn in metaphysics according to which 
we must assess our ontological theories regarding the fundamentality of the 
world on the basis of the contribution they can make to the reconciliation 
between the two images: the materialist criterion of fundamentality. As 
Buonomo (2021) puts it, “the scientific turn in metaphysics takes the fun-
damental categories to be the ones that play an essential role in the expla-
nation of the relation between the ordinary world and the physical universe, 
providing us with a unified image of the world as a whole” (p. 795). 
 The aim of this article is to question an assumption of the materialist 
criterion of fundamentality which claims that the analysis of linguistic be-
havior necessarily produces, as a manifest image, a common-sense realism. 
This assumption, we argue, is based on a Cumpa’s commitment to a form 
of semantic descriptivism (Chrisman 2007; Frapolli and Villanueva 2012; 
Gibbard 2003). Given that, we present a challenge to the criterion in con-
ditional terms: If semantic descriptivism turns to be wrong about certain 
areas of discourse, and thus, the analysis of linguistic behavior cannot pro-
duce a manifest image that allow reconciliation, then the materialist crite-
rion cannot be applied. In section 2, we present Cumpa's materialist crite-
rion of fundamentality and how it works. In section 3, we present the central 
conditional argument and how it jeopardizes the criterion. Further, we ar-
gue that such argument puts defenders of the materialist criterion of fun-
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damentality in a difficult situation. In section 4, we present several argu-
ment from non-descriptivism regarding mental vocabulary to emphasizes 
the impossibility of reconcile folk mentalism and psychology/neurosciences 
in metaphysical terms. 
2. The Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality 
 According to the traditional Aristotelian characterization of metaphys-
ics, ontology is concerned with the study of being qua being, i.e., the iden-
tification of the most general and fundamental categories under which 
things fall and to characterize the relations between these categories. As 
such, ontology aims at seeking to understand the concept of being and ex-
istence and the properties and features that existence things exhibit as be-
ings and existents. In this sense, a central function of metaphysics is to 
provide a map of the structure of all things. Now the question is what is 
the most fundamental of category of the world? Several contemporary au-
thors (Heil 2013, Lowe 2011) have followed Aristotle in claiming that “sub-
stance” is the most fundamental category, while other authors have sup-
ported other categories like “structure” (French 2014, Ladyman and Ross 
2007) or “facts” (Buonomo 2021, Cumpa 2014, 2018) as the fundamental 
category of the world. 
 The debate around the fundamentality of categories leads us to the ques-
tion of how to decide between the different competing views (Cumpa 2020). 
Aristotle defended substantialism on the basis that the category of sub-
stance is prior, simpler and independent of other categories. For instance, 
substance is simpler than other categories because it cannot be divided in 
other categories and it is independent because it does not require other 
categories to exist. Those criteria are still object of debate in contemporary 
metaphysics (see Heil 2012, 2-5, 15; Armstrong 1997, 139-149). However, 
recently, Cumpa (2014) and Buonomo (2021) have proposed a different cri-
terion, what they call the materialist criterion of world-fundamentality. Ac-
cording to this criterion, we must assess our ontological theories regarding 
the fundamentality of categories on the basis of the contribution they can 
make to the reconciliation between the scientific images of the world and 
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the perceived or manifested image of the world. In other words, the explan-
atory power of our theories about categories must be evaluated in terms of 
how the given categories can contribute to a better understanding of how 
the resulting image of how the world is according to our better scientific 
theories is compatible with the picture resulting from our ordinary experi-
ence. 
 Now, how should we understand such reconciliation? to see how, con-
sider how Cumpa constructs his argument supporting the idea that factu-
alism is better positioned for the reconciling task than other theories like 
substantialism. According to the criterion, a category must make sense of 
propositions of the type “A is F” where the two relata of the categorical 
scheme belong to different images. For a given proposition “the tomato is 
red”, the categorial structure allows, for instance, the tomato to be located 
in the manifest image (“Tomato”) and being red in the scientific image (“X 
is able to reflect a dominant wavelength measures between 618 and 780 
nm”). According to Cumpa, factualism allows these type of propositions 
because being red is not a property of the tomato but a constituent of the 
fact, while substantialism does not make sense of such ‘cross-sectional’ prop-
ositions because the substance and its accident must be at the same level 
(Cumpa 2014, 321), that is, the categorial structure does not make the job 
as far as the structure ‘S is P’ corresponds either to the level of things 
(Gracia 1987) or to the elementary particles of physics (see Heil 2012, 52).  
 In brief, Buonomo and Cumpa argue that our disputes regarding the 
fundamentality of categories must arbitrated by an alternative criterion to 
those classically recognized in the debate like priority, simplicity or inde-
pendency. According to this alternative criterion, a particular theory of cat-
egories is better than other when it can accommodate or make sense of 
propositions of the form “A is F” where the two relata can belong to differ-
ent images. As a result, our better theories metaphysical theories will rec-
onciliate our scientific understanding of the world with our everyday expe-
rience to the extent that our metaphysical categories can be compatible 
with propositions like “The tomato is able to reflect a dominant wavelength 
measures between 618 and 780 nm”. 
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3. The Challenge 
 As Heil (1998) said, “science does not speak with a single voice”. There 
is no such thing as science, but sciences (physics, chemistry, meteorology, 
geology, etc.) which focus on a strictly circumscribed domain. In this sense, 
it is inevitable that each science delimits the type of questions that are 
relevant, and that when certain limits are reached, the buck is passed to 
another science. However, even if each sciences were completely successful 
in accounting for its limits, it would still remain to evaluate how each sci-
ence is pronounced in relation to each other, and of course, to our ordinary 
experience. In this sense, even if one doubts the value of pursuing a funda-
mental categorical scheme and embrace metaphysical pluralism, one can 
still find a certain value in the criterion of fundamentality as it would allow 
us to evaluate the relation of the metaphysical categories involved in a 
particular theory or science in relation to our everyday experience. Now, 
the fundamentality criterion requires that one of the stories belongs to the 
scientific sphere which is delimited by the particular science applied in the 
given domain. However, how can we define the area of application that 
belongs to the manifest image? What criterion do we use to decide what 
falls under the “ordinary level of thinghood with which ordinary people are 
acquainted in their commonsensical and practical experience” (Cumpa 2014, 
319)?  
 Cumpa considers that the source of knowledge we must take into ac-
count in order to specify the ordinary world is not phenomenology, but 
rather the analysis of ordinary linguistic behavior. This analysis, he holds, 
leads us to what he calls ‘common-sense realism’. Similarly, Buonomo 
claims that: 
“[c]ommonsense realism and scientific materialism represent the 
two methodological assumptions of the scientific turn in meta-
physics. On the one hand, common sense realism accepts the or-
dinary level of thinghood we are acquainted with in our everyday 
lives and that we speak about in ordinary discourse. On the other 
hand, scientific materialism considers the scientific level of thing-
hood that scientists study through experimental research and rep-
resent with scientific theories.” (Buonomo 2021, 796) 
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 The analysis of linguistic behavior results into a manifest image that com-
mits us with realism about the entities that populate our world. In this sense, 
the materialist criterion of fundamentality presupposes that the analysis of 
our ordinary vocabulary will produce a common-sense image populated with 
objects, relations, and properties.  
 Notice that the scientific turn is undertaking an important semantic com-
mitment to the idea that our everyday discourse is necessary descriptive. So, 
the materialist criterion, as specified by Cumpa and Buonomo, is based on 
semantic descriptivism. Descriptivism is the stance "whereby it's assumed 
that since semantic content of indicative sentences is standardly given in 
terms of their truth-conditions, the characteristic function of all indicative 
sentences is to describe worldly objects, properties, and relations" (Chrisman 
2007, 227). In other words, the idea behind the characterization of the ordi-
nary world relies on the assumption that the function of linguistic expressions 
is mainly descriptive. Certainly, this would seem obvious in the areas of dis-
course Cumpa and Buonomo are thinking of; for instance, ordinary objects 
(tables, chairs) and their properties (brown, rigid). However, this is not nec-
essarily the case for all areas of discourse. In philosophical literature, we can 
find a set of views that share the denial of the descriptivist reading of a certain 
type of expressions or sentences. For instance, several views in metaethics like 
ethical expressivism (Gibbard 2003) or quasi-realism (Blackburn 1998) deny 
that sentences such as ‘eating meat is wrong' describe a fact, namely, that a 
piece of behavior has a value property (being wrong). Similar positions are 
maintained about expressions such as epistemic attributions (Chrisman 2007, 
Field 2009), logical concepts (Brandom 2001), attribution of rationality (Gib-
bard 1990, Frapolli and Villanueva 2018) or modal expressions (Blackburn 
1986, Thomasson 2014). The analysis of linguistic behavior, these authors 
suggest, can result in discovering that certain vocabulary is non-descriptive, 
and thus, its use does not commit us to any particular metaphysical counter-
part. 
 The descriptive assumption of Cumpa and Buonomo have two important 
negative consequences for the criterion of fundamentality when seen from the 
perspective of the anti-descriptivist analysis. First, as several authors have 
argued (Chrisman 2008, Horgan and Timmons 1992, Mackie 1977), assuming 
descriptivism entails strong metaphysical commitments to the existence of 
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nonnatural facts or entities like, for example, evil or goodness. These kinds of 
metaphysical entities, however, do not seem to be the kind of objects, prop-
erties and relationships that are part of a common-sense realism. In this sense, 
the descriptive commitments of Cumpa and Buonomo do not seem compati-
ble with the idea of the manifest image that they themselves promulgate. The 
descriptivist assumption produces an untenable manifest image that does not 
correspond with common-sense realism.  
 Second, if the anti-descriptivist analysis is right, the semantic analysis of 
natural languages that Cumpa endorses does not seems to produce even an 
image that is reconcilable with the scientific image when understood from the 
right metaphysical category. That is because if certain areas of discourse do 
not refer or state worldly aspects, then worldly metaphysical categories do 
not seem to apply to them. It is precisely this last consequence which seems 
especially challenging for Cumpa and Buonomo when we attempt to apply 
their criteria to certain areas of discourse that must be reconcilable with a 
scientific image but that are subject to an anti-descriptivist analysis like, for 
instance, mental vocabulary in relation with neurosciences or cognitive psy-
chology.  
 To see how, consider that, according to Cumpa and Buonomo, the mate-
rialist criterion of fundamentality requires our categories to be able to explain 
how propositions involving the given terms can have their components in 
different images. The basic assumption is that propositions like “Pablo be-
lieves that the toy is on the table” must be understood from the a categorial 
structure that allows understand the two component of the proposition from 
common-sense realism: “a person named Pablo”, “a particular mental state”, 
and from the perspective of the scientific image like “A biological organism 
P”, “a neuronal state M”. Then, the Sellarsian question of ontology is to 
reconcile the tension that, for instance, “a mental state” and “a neural state 
M” does not seem to have the same properties but are really the same object 
(Cumpa 2018). The tension, Cumpa and Buonomo argue, is resolved when a 
particular category like “facts” allow to say that the propositions “A person 
named Pablo is in a particular mental state M” and “A biological organism 
P is in a neuronal state M” represent the same fact. Factualism can claim 
that both propositions represent the same fact precisely because we can ex-
change the relata to form two different propositions with one relata in each 
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image but referring to the same fact: “A biological organism P is in a mental 
state M” and “A person named Pablo is in a particular neuronal state M”. 
Now, the problem is that anti-descriptivist analysis of mental vocabulary does 
not result into a common-sense realism.  According to anti-descriptivism, the 
sentence “Pablo believes that the toy is on the table” does not describe or 
represent a particular object, property or relation. In particular, the expres-
sion “X Believes that the toy is on the table” cannot be substituted for an 
expression like “x is in a mental state M” where the expression represents or 
state for a property or a worldly aspect because the expression “believes” does 
not have descriptive meaning.  
 In a nutshell, metaphysical categories cannot help to reconciliate the two 
images because the linguistic analysis of the manifest image does not neces-
sarily result into a picture where those categories apply. Now, such a claim 
just holds if anti-descriptivism of mental vocabulary turns to be right. But, 
what exactly mental vocabulary does if it does not describe? Do we have 
compelling arguments for supporting anti-descriptivism?  
4. Anti-Descriptivism and Psychology 
 The point of contention raised in this paper is not straightforwardly tied 
to anti-descriptivism regarding modality or other metaphysical expressions 
(Blackburn 1986, Thomasson 2014). The key point is not whether expres-
sions like “possibly, p” or “it is a fact that p” describe or not. On the 
contrary, the idea is that the criterion of fundamentality presupposes that 
the manifest image as produced by a linguistic analysis must be grounded 
in the reality in a way that every predicate or expression that compound a 
judgment of the manifest image is somehow anchored in the world; and 
thus, subject to be reconciliate with the scientific image1. However, we ar-
gue, if a descriptivism regarding mental vocabulary is right, and mental 
states predicates are not anchored in the world, the reconciliation is not 
possible, and thus, the criterion is useless, at least, for the domain of psy-
chology and neurosciences in connection with the manifest image regarding 
 
1  Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the possibility that these two 
different projects could be confused. 
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our minds. In this section, we recapitulate some arguments supporting a 
non-descriptivist analysis of mental predicates.  
 Anti-descriptivism regarding mental states is a position that can be as-
sociated to different families of theories that goes from classical disposition-
alism2 of Wittgenstein (1953) and Ryle (1949) or the parentheticallism  of 
Urmson (1952) to more contemporary theories like expressivism (Fernandez 
Castro 2017, Frapolli and Villanueva 2012, Perez-Navarro et al. 2019; 
Pinedo-García 2020), communicative conceptions of attribution (Fernandez 
Castro (2020), Tooming (2016), Van Cleave and Gauker 2010) or radical 
socio-cultural constructivism of mindreading (Almagro-Holgado and Fer-
nandez Castro 2019; Fenici and Zawidzki 2020). Although they radically 
differ in the details, these views share the basic claim that mental states 
vocabulary serve for a different function than describing or tracking each 
other psychological states. For instance, Ryle (1949) understands disposi-
tional terms3  as inferential tickets: "an inference ticket (a season ticket) 
 
2  Although the work of Wittgenstein and Ryle is usually presented in 
contraposition to theories about the nature of the mind, like dualism or functionalism 
(see Ravencroft, 2005), Ryle and Wittgenstein present their views as positions about 
the use of psychological concepts, rather than views about the ontology of the mind. 
Moreover, Ryle and Wittgenstein do not have a realist interpretation of dispositional 
vocabulary, that is, they did not understand dispositional ascriptions as describing 
psychological states (Acero and Villanueva 2012, Freitag 2017, Glock 1996; Hacker 
2010, Ter Hark 2001, Heras-Escribano and Pinedo-García 2018. Tanney 2007, 2009) 
3  Wittgenstein and Ryle systematically emphasize the idea that their research is 
not ontological but logical or conceptual. His philosophical enterprise is not to 
describe human psychological processes or to propose scientific theories concerning 
the mind: “The book does not profess to be a contribution to any science, not even 
to psychology. If any actual assertions are made in it, they are there through the 
author’s confusion of mind” (1962, 196). On this account, the philosophical purpose 
of Ryle is to provide a conceptual clarification of how mental concepts are used, 
rather than elucidating what ‘knowing’, ‘feeling’ or ‘remembering’ is. Similar ideas 
can be found in Wittgenstein’s work (1953, §89-90, 127, 199, 232, 392, 496, 574; 
1974, 60). For instance, he claims: “Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. 
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings 
away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, 
by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language 
—Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; 
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which licenses its possessors… to move from one assertion to another, to 
provide explanations of given facts, and to bring about desired states of 
affairs by manipulating what is found existing or happening" (p. 117). Ex-
pressions such as ‘Sara believes that Riga is the capital of Latvia' function 
to make inferential moves: ‘Sara believes that Latvia has a capital', ‘If Sara 
wants to move to the capital of Latvia, she will take a flight to Riga' and 
so on. However, understanding dispositional terms as inferential tickets goes 
against considering them factual psychological states. As Tanney (2007, 
2009; see also Heras-Escribano and Pinedo-García 2018) has emphasized, 
Ryle insists systematically in abandoning: "the preposterous assumption 
that every true or false statement either asserts or denies that a mentioned 
object or set of objects possesses a specified attribute" (Ryle 1949, 115).  
 Another example of how to understand non-descriptivism regarding psy-
chological states is through their pragmatic function. Several authors argue 
that firs person ascriptions of mental states do not serve for describing one’s 
mental states but for indicating certain degree of uncertainty or how to 
understand a particular proposition (Fenici & Zawidzki, 2020, Urmson 1952, 
Wierzbicka 2006). This means that, in sentences such as "I believe that the 
Indian restaurant is closed", the verb "believe" is not describing a mental 
state properly but merely indicating a low degree of commitment to the 
proposition "the Indian restaurant is closed". As Wierbicka (2006) points 
out, verbs in this use serve to modulate the interpretation of the proposition 
that falls under the scope of the verb. The verb "believe" serves to deny our 
knowledge of something, but not by saying "I don't know", but by saying 
"I don't say: I know".  Similar analyses have been extended to third-person 
ascriptions (Fernandez Castro 2019, van Cleave and Gauker 2010, Geurt 
2021), for instance, van Cleave and Gauker (2010) argue that third person 
ascriptions of desire, for instance, are used to carry out vicarious speech 
acts, so sentences like “Mom wants us to clean the room” serve to make a 
command (clean your room!) on the behalf of another person (the mother).  
 Be that as it may, the key point is that we have different analysis to 
motivate a non-descriptivist understanding of mental states predicates. 
 
this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is 
sometimes like one of taking a thing apart” (Wittgenstein 1953, §90). 
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Now, do we have arguments to support them? Ryle and Wittgenstein de-
veloped different argument to support non-descriptivism. For instance, Ryle 
argues that mental dispositions, as skills, cannot be witnessed or captured, 
and thus, they are not metaphysically grounded in the world: 
Now a skill is not an act. It is therefore neither a witnessable nor 
an unwitnessable act. To recognise that a performance is an ex-
ercise of a skill is indeed to appreciate it in the light of a factor 
which could not be separately recorded by a camera. But the 
reason why the skill exercised in a performance cannot be sepa-
rately recorded by a camera is not that it is an occult or ghostly 
happening, but that it is not a happening at all. (Ryle, 1949/2009, 
22)  
Skills, as other mental states, cannot be recorded with a camera, they are not 
winessable (or unwitnessable), not because they are hidden, but because they 
are not the type of mental phenomena we can point out or describe. In a 
similar vein, Wittgenstein (1967) presented the argument of duration, accord-
ing to which, contrary to descriptive states, it does not make sense to say 
that a dispositional state (belief, desire, hope) takes time: 
Is "I hope ..." a description of a state of mind? A state of mind 
has duration. So "I have been hoping for the whole day" is such 
a description; but suppose I say to someone: "I hope you come"- 
what if he asks me "For how long have you been hoping that?" Is 
the answer "For as long as I've been saying so"? Supposing I had 
some answer or other to that question, would it not be quite 
irrelevant to the purpose of the words "I hope you'll come”? 
(Wittgenstein 1967, §78)  
While it makes sense to ask for how long a state of affairs has been the case, 
it is unusual to ask for the duration of propositional attitude. Thus, the type 
of condition criteria of a propositional attitude ascription differs from those 
of a description. Another argument in that direction has to do with the gram-
matical or logical connection between a propositional attitude verb and its 
propositional object. When we say, ‘Sara hopes that Beyoncé will record a 
new album’, Wittgenstein argues, the established connection between the 
12  Víctor Fernández Castro 
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propositional object and the subject ‘Sara’ is not empirical, but logical (Witt-
genstein 1967, 1974), and this type of connections cannot be described. The 
meaning of an expression is given by its connection with other expressions 
(Wittgenstein 1974, §7). Thus, the connection between Sara’s hope and its 
fulfillment is not empirical, and as such, is not descriptive. If Sara behaves in 
accordance with her hopes, we would say our attribution is right, and we 
would say is wrong otherwise; but this depends on the logical behavior of the 
concept ‘hope’ and not on an independent empirical connection between Sara 
and the proposition ‘Beyoncé will record a new album’.  
 For the current purpose, another important argument lies on the impos-
sibility of linking the vocabulary of sciences and the mental and appears on 
the work Donald Davidson (1970, 1991). Davidson presents different argu-
ments supporting the claim that we cannot draw strict laws connecting the 
mental vocabulary and the vocabulary of physics. For instance, Davidson 
(1970, 172) suggests that we cannot establish strict laws between the mental 
discourse and the discourse of the physical sciences without changing the 
subject because the features of the two different vocabularies are unique to 
each one. As Ramberg (2000) has convincingly argued, this criterion does not 
apply uniquely to the distinction between the mental and the sciences, but 
also, to the distinction between physics and the special sciences. As he puts 
it: “Davidson grants that the relevant kind of law—that is, the strict kind –
is no more likely to link special sciences to physics than it is to link psychology 
to physics” (p. 359). But, Davidson (1991) presents a distinctive reason for 
emphasizing the peculiarity of the mental vocabulary, i.e., the normative el-
ements of mental states attributions. The critical question is not only that 
the vocabulary of agency involves the application of norms, but that the 
norms provide structure to the vocabulary (Ramberg 2000, 359). When we 
interpret others’ actions, we are trying to find patterns by finding descriptions 
of what the other is doing. Finding such patterns depends on normative cri-
teria of application of the concepts. In this sense, mental vocabulary may not 
differ from the vocabulary of sciences. However, Davidson’s argue, finding 
such patterns requires taking a normative standpoint invoked by the charity 
principle, that is, we must assume that our interpretee meets the norms of 
rationality in order to find such patterns. Mental vocabulary does not only 
require norms of application but making claims about what sort of patterns 
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count or not as mental. Thus, our interpretation of other creatures as mental 
are so intrinsically connected to a normative attitude that “If we were to drop 
the normative aspect from psychological explanations, they would no longer 
serve the purposes they do. We have such a keen interest in the reasons for 
actions and other psychological phenomena that we are willing to settle for 
explanations that cannot be made to fit perfectly with the laws of physics” 
(Davidson 1991, 163). In Davidson’s view, mental vocabulary serves a dis-
tinctive purpose than the vocabulary of sciences, a purpose that is not merely 
picking up objects for prediction and control. Mental vocabulary serves us to 
reveal the traits that allow us to recognize ourselves as creatures subject to 
moral and rational considerations, who can be burden with duties, commit-
ments and rights (Ramberg 2000, 366).  
 Finally, several contemporary defenders of expressivism have defended 
that disagreement involving normative concepts also manifest an evaluative 
(and non-descriptive) function of those concepts (Chrisman 2007; Field 2009, 
Perez Navarro et al. 2019). According to those authors, disagreements involv-
ing normative concepts cannot be resolved by appealing to fact. In order to 
see the move, consider the following examples of disagreement:  
 [1]    Shaq: The earth is flat 
   Kyrie: The earth is not flat  
 [2]    Chris: Waterboarding is wrong  
   Hitch: Waterboarding is not wrong   
Notice that the disagreement between Shaq and Kyrie can be solved by clear-
ing up the relevant facts, viz. determining whether the earth is flat. Instead, 
the disagreement between Chris and Hitch does not necessarily dissolve after 
determining the relevant facts. We can imagine a situation where Chris and 
Hitch agree on all factual matters and still disagree about whether water-
boarding is wrong. Moreover, the disagreement in question does not neces-
sarily dissolve when the normative standards are made explicit, removing the 
possibility that description is dependent of norms:  
 [2]’  Chris: According to the Human Rights Declaration, waterboarding 
is wrong  
14  Víctor Fernández Castro 
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Hitch: According to the Eight Amendment, waterboarding is not 
wrong   
We can conceive situations where Chris and Hitch do not necessarily resolve 
their dispute after making the norms explicit. Now, Perez-Navarro et al. 
(2019) have elaborated upon this argument to defend that we can identify 
evaluative disagreements involving belief attributions.  They illustrate the 
point with an example by Dennett (1978) where he invites to consider the 
case of Sam, an art critic who has promoted the paintings of his son. There 
are two possible interpretations of this situation: “a) Sam does not believe 
the paintings are any good, but out of loyalty and love he does this to help 
his son, or (b) Sam’s love for his son has blinded him to the faults of the 
paintings, and he actually believes they are good” (Dennett 1978, 39). Now, 
suppose for the sake of the argument that there exists a reliable way of de-
termining the cause of someone’s actions. Imagine, as Dennett does, that we 
have the technology to write a specific judgment in Sam’s brain. Imagine that 
we write ‘my son’s paintings are great’ at the moment he is promoting his 
son’s paintings. In fact, we can suppose that this was the occurrent cause of 
the action (promoting his son) at that moment. Dennett’s point is that, even 
in this extreme case, there are no deep facts we can appeal to in order to 
decide whether the ascription of this belief is certainly explanatory of the 
situation. Someone could examine the past and future circumstances of Sam 
and suspend the interpretation that Sam believes that his son’s paintings are 
good. The interpreter could examine Sam’s past behavior and realize that he 
systematically avoided assessing his son’s paintings using the same aesthetics 
standards that he used for other artists, or that his subsequent behavior is 
incoherent with the decision of promoting his son’s paintings. These circum-
stances would provide the interpreter with reasons to change his verdict. At 
the same time, the other interpreter could insist that the accurate ascription 
is the one that identifies the real cause of the behavior. However, it is dubious 
whether we can decide which belief ascription is right by appealing to the 
mere facts. Both interpreters could agree on all the relevant facts and differ 
on their ascriptions. Moreover, even when if both interpreters would make 
their norms of interpretation explicit—e.g., appealing to the Sam’s incoher-
ence or sincerity—the disagreement would not necessarily disappear.  
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 As a result, we have reasons to believe that mental states attributions and 
predicates do not describe entities of any type. Acknowledging the possibility 
that linguistic expressions might not identify a particular object, relation or 
property may jeopardize the idea of a manifest image in common sense realist 
terms or a manifest image at all, and thus, the applicability of the materialist 
criterion of fundamentality may be severely restricted. Certainly, this conclu-
sion is dependent on the persuasion of non-descriptivist arguments. However, 
to the extent that the materialist criterion depends on a descriptive seman-
tics, one should, at least, critically face the arguments and motivations behind 
non-descriptive semantics to save the applicability of the criterion.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 Where does this leave the scientific turn in metaphysics? one possible 
way to save the criteria is by finding an alternative possibility to ground 
the ordinary level of thinghood other than linguistic analysis. After all, it 
seems plausible to maintain that, even if the use of certain expressions is 
not aimed to describe or represent the world, ordinary people could have 
some common-realist intuitions concerning the status of our mental life. 
Now, the question is whether we could find a way to rescue these intuitions. 
Certainly, one possible alternative is to appeal to phenomenology as a way 
of constructing the manifest image but Cumpa seems inclined to resist such 
a strategy (Cumpa 2014, 320). Although he does not specify why, one may 
speculate that the reason is related to the possible problems one may en-
counter when trusting one's own experience or intuitions regarding mental 
states; for instance, the possibility that our own experience dramatically 
differs from each other's.  A plausible middle path could try to exploit 
Dennett's (1991) hetero-phenomenology. In this view, we could create a 
profile of the people’s reports about their own experiences and intuitions 
regarding other's and their own mental states (Dennett 1991, 76-77). So, 
the ordinary level of thinghood could be grounded in people's reports about 
their own experience. We can control the problems emerging with phenom-
enology by testing only the intuitions that are statistically significant inside 
of a given population. Be that as it may, this alternative implies abandoning 
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the analysis of linguistic behavior as the procedure to construct our manifest 
image. 
 Leaving aside the alternative in (hetero)phenomenological terms, there 
seems to be a deeper problem with Cumpa and Buonomo's reconciliatory 
project. In principle, as the history of science has demonstrated, it seems 
likely that some important aspects of our manifest image do not lend them-
selves to a metaphysical reconciliation of some kind with science, but to 
another kind of assimilation such as the elimination or, like the case of the 
mind, a more complex assimilation than mere metaphysical mapping. Per-
haps, the response can be found in the work of Sellars himself. Sellars (1956) 
seems to defend certain type of non-descriptivism when he says ‘in charac-
terizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an 
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical 
space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says’ (§36). 
Such a claim, along with his complaint that such descriptive treatment of 
knowledge would be ‘a mistake of a piece with so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ 
in ethics” (§5), must be regarded as an indicator of the limits of the recon-
ciling metaphysical enterprise; at least, if we understand the enterprise as 
establishing metaphysical connections between two types of images that 
serve radically different objectives and interests. The alternative may not 
be necessarily the skepticism, but simply seeking reconciliation beyond the 
metaphysical enterprise of categories, for example, understanding that the 
scientific picture must give us an adequate picture of how we humans, as 
natural beings, are able to create for ourselves a picture of the world that 
is presented to us in such and such a way. To try to assimilate one image 
to the other in terms of worldly categories is perhaps only a metaphysical 
dream.    
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